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In spring 1989 the oil carrier 'Exxon Valdez' ran aground off the Alaskan coast and 
caused a major oil spill entailing high dean-up costs as weil as losses to fishing and 
related industries. The incident demonstrated anew the growing risk of environmental 
damage inherent in modern industrial activity and emphasized the need for applicable 
rules governing liability for transnational environmental damage. 
Conventional (i.e. treaty-based) regimes play an important role in the current 
discussion on international liability for transnational environmental damage. In order to 
assess their value as precedents for the development of applicable general rules 
regarding transnational liability, this article analyses the interest of states in the process 
of regime-creation and the economic and historical background that has heavily 
influenced the Jiability regimes themselves. 
1. Liability for Risk 
Traditionally, claims for compensation oftransnational environmental damage had to 
be basecl on the concept of state responsibility and, more precisely, on the rule of due 
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diligence. lt is accepted that liability exists for failure to observe international obliga-
tions but the doctrine leaves many questions unanswered. For example, before states 
become responsible for damage caused to other states customary international law 
requires that there be a breach ofan established international obligation. lt is frequently 
difficult, in the absence of clear and binding obligations established by treaty, to 
determine that any obligation exists in a particular case. The doctrine of state 
sovereignty over territory and the resources therein has predominated. Even if an 
obligation can be evidenced or implied, such as a duty to take care in carrying out certain 
activities, states may be held liable only if they are negligent, i.e. at fault in failing to 
observe the standard of care required (due diligence). These standards are frequently 
hard to identify or vaguely expressed, or their legal status may be controversial if they are 
formulated in terms of'guidelines' or 'codes ofconduct'. Attribution to states offailures 
to act on the part of their state organs or officials also poses problems. 
lt is, moreover, not yet clear, in the absence of treaties, that states can be held 
absolutely or strictly liable for their damaging activities, even if they engage in ultra-
hazardous enterprises, or those with a forseeable risk of damage, such as operating 
nuclear or other power stations, using ships to transport oil and other hazardous or 
noxious cargoes, disposing of toxic wastes, exploiting seabed resources or outer space. 
etc. 
In spite of the increasing number of cases of transnational environmental damage, 
compensation thus is in fact paid only very rarely. Furthermore, payment is normally 
based not on customary international law but on regimes for certain specific areas of 
transnational pollution established by liability conventions or it is paid 'ex gratia' 1 i.e. 
without acceptance of the formal obligation to compensate. 
Partly this might be due to the vagueness of customary law as outlined above. An 
increasing amount of industrial activity has escaped the rule of due diligence,2 as 
advanced technological development involves a huge amount of risk for accidental 
transnational environmental damage. The risk inherent in complex industrial processes 
can be minimized but not completely avoided.3 As long as a breach of a rule of 
international law is a necessary prerequisite for a claim of compensation, the source 
activity has tobe classified as prohibited by international law, entailing the consequence 
that it may not be continued legally.4 lt is, however, a general concern of states to avoid 
exactly this consequence for activities they consider necessary, or at least profitable, for 
their economies. Therefore, states normally avoid accepting the obligation to pay 
compensation for transnational environmental damage. 
Consequently, the economic costs of dangerous activities are externalized. Some 
scholars emphasize the distribution of wealth as the primary objective of liability and 
hold that an externalization of costs is a deprivation ofrights and amenities ofthe victim 
1 See Rudolf, 'Haftung für rechtmäßiges Verhalten im Völkerrecht', Fuuclrrijlfor Otta MW!J, Stuttgart 1g81, 
551-2. 
2 See however Caubct, 'Le Droit international en qucte d'une responsabilite pour les dommages resultant!I 
d'activites qu'il n'interdit pa.s', AM1U1irt Fr0llf4isth Droil llllmultünuzl 19831 991 trying to stay within the realm ofstate 
responsibility. He distinguishes between the internarionally lawful conduct itself and the wrongf ul transboundary 
harm caused by this conduct. 
' See Ro8nagel, 'Die rechtliche Fassung technischer Risiken', UTTWJ1//. wuJ P/4mmgsredzJ 1g86, 46 and Quentin· 
Ba.xtcr, 'First Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequenccs Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law', ltUm!atWM./ Law Cornmissünt, Yearboo! 19flo, para 38. 
4 See Magraw, 'Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of "International 
Liability" ', Amniumjmmud oj /ltlmulJiq,fgj Law 1 g86, 318. 
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in favour of the benefit of the risk-creator.5 Others focus on the preventive function of an 
increased obligation to compensate transboundary environmental damage6 and imply 
that the risk-creator will invest additional resources in preventive measure when costs of 
accidental pollution are intemalized. Both arguments require liability to be streng-
thened. The burden of proof should no longer rest on the victim. In other words, the 
traditional system of fault-liability should be replaced by one of strict or absolute 
liability7 at least for so-called 'ultra-hazardous'8 activities.9 
Several authors believe that the concept of international liability should be developed 
on the basis of establishing a general obligation of strict or absolute liability for 
environmental damage as a primary rule on international law. 10 Apart from the general 
desirability of strengthened liability for environmental damage, on what evidence, 
however, is this theory founded? 
First of all, its proponents produce several prominent cases of international dispute 
settlement. These are, however, only of doubtful value regarding the development of 
a general obligation to strict international liability. 11 More importantly, it remains to 
be proved that 'a few partly isolated and hardly representative' 12 decisions of inter-
national tribunals rendered in specific political situations in the field of environmental 
disputes provide an appropriate basis from which to derive legal norms capable of 
influencing today's political decision-makers. For 'the interests and aims of States ... 
explain why particular rules and principles are created and why they are (or are not) 
carried out'. 13 
Secondly, an increasing amount ofinternational conventions governing third-party-
liability in specific fields seems to corroborate this theory. lt is true that all these 
conventions are based on the principle of strict and absolute liability and thus avoid the 
necessity of proving the breach of a rule of international law prior to a claim for 
compensation. Not all of them, however, are concluded in order to tighten the legal 
remedy for the benefit of victims. And not all of them contain an obligation of international 
liability (i.e. liability hetween states). 
No doubt, international conventions reftect the intention and the view of political 
decision-makers in a much more realistic way than do isolated coun decisions. They 
establish detailed regimes intended generally to govern liability disputes in the specified 
field. They are, furthermore, the result of co-operation between government officials and 
~ See Goldie, 'Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Tenns of Relative 
Exposure to Risk', Nttlrerlands Yearl>ok of lntmuztitmal Law 1g85, 1go scq. lf there iJ an economic advantage in 
transporting crude oil in very large crude carriers and if this activity involves a !arger risk of oil spilb, then the 
possible victim pays for the economic advantage of the opcrator of thcsc ships. 
6 See Hand!, 'Liability a.s an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law', Ne//rn/ands 
Yearbook of lnlnn4ti11t111/ law 1g85, 76 seq. 
1 See Gündling, 'Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten für grenzüberschreitende Umweltbeeinträchtigungen', Ztü-
selrrifl far a&1liuuJisdw ö.ff tnJlidus &dtt U1UI VölhmdU 1 g85, 287. 
8 For the concept, scejenks, 'Liability for tlltra-hazardous Activiries in International Law', &cunl des Cous 117 
(1g66-I), 107. 
9 Thcoretically, Hand!, 'State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private 
Persons', Amnican jw.Tlllll of /111tmatio111Z/ law 1g8o, 553 scq, did establish the obligation of states based on strict 
liability for damage arising out of ultra-hazardous activities. 
10 See, for instancc,J. Schneider, World Puhlic Orlkr ojtlu Ellllirvnmnil, Toronto 1979, 163 scq. 11 Schneider (n 10), 165 scq, for instance produccs thc Traü-S1111/tn-, Corfa-CluztmtJ- and Gvl-Dom-Cucs, whcrcas 
Hand!, (n 9), 537, denounces the validity of all of them a.s unpcrsuasive. 
12 Lang, 'Haftung und Verantwonlichkeit im internationalen Umweltrecht', illl H1111UU1ilalis; Ftstscl1riflfor Alfred 
Vmlros.r, Berlin 1g8o, 517 (translation provided). 
" Sehachter, 'International Law in Theory and Practice', Rmui/ des Coiirs 178 (1g82-V), 47. 
4 GÜNTHER DOEKER AND THOMAS OEHRING 
legislative authorities and, in that regard, indicate the true level oflegal obligation the 
participating state authorities were prepared to accept at the same time of the regime 
creation. 14 
This article tries to investigate the direction in which the international conventional 
law of liability for transnational environmental damage is currently developing. lt 
attempts to introduce into the discussion of the development of general rulcs ofliability 
the parameter ofthe economic and historical background ofthe respective conventions. 
The general importance ofthis parameter for the analysis ofintemational law has been 
pointed out elsewhere, 1 ~ but a detailed analysis of this aspect has, to our knowledge, not 
been carried out to date. 
II. Private Liability Regimes in Conventional International Law 
In regard to the political, ecological and economic circumstances, the civil liability 
regime for oil pollution damage16 is a precedent for several international conventional 
regimes goveming liability for transnational environmental damage. The accidental 
grounding ofthe tanker 'Torrey Canyon' in 1967 Jed to a major oil spill in the English 
Channel and faced the British govemment with large expenditure17 in clean-up costs as 
well as in reimbursement to private victims and regional entities. Liability according to 
traditional private maritime law amounted to only $48. 18 The then lntergovemmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), now known as the 1 MO, undertook at 
the request of the British government, a study of the possible consequences of the 
disaster. Among the subjects identified by the 1MC0 Council for immediate scrutiny 
was the issue of increased liability, which required investigation of: 
'all qucstions relating to the nature ( whether absolute or not), extent and amount ofliability of the 
owner or opcrator ofa ship or the owner ofthe cargo Uointly or severally) for damage caused to 
third parties by accidents suffered by the ship involving the discharge of persistent oils or other 
noxious or hazardous substances and in particular whether it would not bc advisable 
(a) to make some form of insurance of the liability compulsory; 
(b) to make arrangements to enablc governments and injured parties tobe compcnsated for the 
damage due to the casualty and the costs incurred in combating pollution ofthe sea and cleaning 
poll u ted property .19 
Already this initial mandate for 1 M C 0 the newly established Legal Committee 
clarified for whose benefit the inquiry was tobe undertaken. Be the injured parties and 
those who bad incurred expenditures in clean-up costs governments or private persons, 
14 For thc imporuncc of trcaty law in this rcgartf, sec 0 EC 0: /UsflOWÜÜJ aJld LUI/Jüi17 of Slales in RelaJW• ID 
Tra1tSfrortJin PolluJUm, Paris 1g84, 4 and Goldic (n 5), 245. 
1 ~ Sec Rcisman, 'The lncidcnt as a Dccisional Unit in International Law', Yak Journal of llllmt4JißMJ law r!JS.4, 1 
5i6 lrtJmrJJJional Col'IMllion 011 Cillil LUlbilit] for Oü Pollutimi Damatt 1g6g; lllltrrr4.mnaJ ltgal MaJerials 1970, 45; 
ltlln'naliMral ColWtlltiml 011 tlu Eslllblis/rmmJ of tm lnU171ation4' FwuJ for CmnpasaJU>11 for Oü Pollu.tioR Damag1 1971; 
/lfJmlatioNJJ legal MaJnialJ 1972, 28+ 
17 Sec Brown, 'Thc Lessons ofthc Torrcy Canyon', C11rmtJ legal Problnru 1g68, 113 scq. 
18 Stt Sisson, 'Oil Pollution Law and thc Limitation of Llability Act; A Murky Sca for Claimants Against 
VC!SSCls',J""rna/ of Maritime Law aNi Commmt 1917f78, 286. 
19 1 MCO-Doc C/ES.y5. 
LIABILITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 5 
the policy objective of a new conventional regime was to be the strengthening of 
compensation payable to the victims suffering material loss or damage from such oil 
spills.20 
The mandate indicated also that increased liability was--at least in part-to be 
placed on private industry involved in the dangerous business concemed, which should 
be compelled to cover the risk by insurance.21 States did not seriously discuss the 
possibility of placing international liability on the flagstate of a damage-prone tanker. 
The proposal of Liberia, a state representing a major 'fiag on convenience', that states 
should consider the possibility of multilateral governmental relief action instead of 
putting the burden on the hard-pressed shipping industry22 and a suggestion that 
national relief funds23 should be set up were unsuccessful. They did not reftect the fact 
that it was the British State that had initiated the project in order to be better 
compensated for damage and clean-up costs alongside British coasts. 1 t was obvious that 
neither proposal met this goal. Therefore the international community was not prepared 
to assume joint international liability. 
Once it was decided, in accordance with the views of the oil24 and the shipping 
industry,~ that Iiability was to be concentrated ('channelled') onto the owner of the 
tanker, the prime questions concemed the maximum amount of the damage to be 
insurable26 and thus made acceptable, and whether liability was to be strict or based on 
fault with a reversal of the burden of proof 27 This dispute reftects the two camps into 
which states participating in the negotiations were divided. Whereas maritime nations, 
desiring to protect their national industry against a heavy additional liability burden, 
favoured a rather restricted approach, coastal states, confronted with great economic 
hardship arising out of the dangerous activity, were not prepared to agree to a solution 
leaving them bearing part of the costs involved. Here we are faced with a typical 
confrontaion of interests in negotiations aiming at shifting the economic risk arising from 
dangerous activities. 
To resolve this situation, the idea was born of establishing an International Fund 
financed by the oil industry to provide new funds for compensation.28 Again there was no 
discussion of direct participation in the Fund ofstates themselves. 29 States did not even 
20 Thus rhe disrribution ofwealth and amenitics was the primary argumcnr for thc liability regimc, whcrcas thc 
re-cnforccment of prcvcnrion prior IJJ an aa:idml was to be achicved by a numbcr of administrative and tcchnical 
mcasurcs. 
21 Thus guaranrccing thc financial asscu as a ncccuary countcrmcasure against 'onc-ship-companics', sec D. 
Abccassis, Th Law aNi Practiu Reilzting w Oil PolluJWnfrom Sllips, London 1978, 204 scq. 
22 1 MCO-Doc LEG 11/SR.6, p. 11. 
" Sec Report ofthe Working Group on liability LEG/WG (11) Ih 
„ Thc oil industry had concluded already, during the discussioll5 in 1 M C O's Legal Committce, the Tanhr 
Owners VollUIJary Agreemml Conuming liability far Oil Po/Uition (TO VAL 0 P), a privare agrccmcnr for compcnsation 
on a limircd, but ncvcrthclcss extended, lcvcl; b1tmraJüntJJJ Liga/ Matnials 1g6g, 497. 
25 See draft convention of rhe International Maritime Committcc, Documcntarion 191i8, Vol 1 V, Doc TC-22, 
and slightly rcvi.scd vcr.iion, Vol V, TC-24. 
211 Only in this conncxion did thc so-called 'ßritish cxccptions' bccomc an important issue sincc thc Brirish 
govcmmcnt, rcprcsenting thc primarily London-bascd maritime insurancc industry, hcld thar insurance covcr was 
not available withour thcsc cxccptions; sec 1 MCO, O.JlicW Reurds of tlu lnJmuJJüntJJJ Llgtd Confertnu on Marüu 
Po/lll.titm Damllgt 1g6g, London 1973, LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.35. 
77 Sec draft convcntion ofthc Legal Commincc rcftccting both proposab; Official Records (n 26) LEG/CON F/ 
C.2/4. 
28 Prior to thc international confcrcncc, oil companics agrced on a private 'Contract Regarding an Interim 
Su~plemcnt to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution' (CR 1 ST A L);Jormud of Maritimt Uuu twl Commrra 1970/71, 705. 
See Report ofrhe Working Group; Official Rccords (n 26) LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.45. 
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accept that they should underwrite a guarantee of the financial contributions of the 
respective national oil industries under their control.30 
The 1MC0 Council had included within its mandate an inquiry into possible 
restrictions of passage through certain dangerous straits and areas by ships carrying 
certain dangerous or noxious cargoes.31 This inquiry never took place and one may 
doubt whether it would have been acceptable to the majority of delegations participating 
in 1MC0, given their generally favourable attitude to the maritime transport industry. 
lt might however explain the fairly eo-operative attitude ofmajor oil companies towards 
acceptance of an increased liability. 
lt is true that later the 1978 'Amoco Cadiz' casualty disclosed the insufficiency of the 
funds available32 and that in a few other cases refundable claims had had to be 
apportioned.33 This does not mean, however, that the private liability system has 
reached its limits.34 States have reacted by concluding additional protocols,35 primarily 
extending both the available amount of compensation and reducing the clauses of 
exemption.36 
The private-financed oil pollution liability scheme was the first of its type. lt heavily 
inftuenced several subsequent approaches to the negotiation of other Iiability regimes. 
The so far unsuccessful attempt to extend the private liability regime to maritime 
transport of dangerous substances other37 than oil would combine the obligations of the 
ship owners and cargo interests in one treaty. Being an extension of the oil pollution 
regime, it is not surprising that states again were not prepared to engage in any liability 
scheme. 38 A similar project regarding inland transport of dangerous goods39 is, nonethe-
less, currentJy being negotiated in the Economic Commission for Europe. 
Another attempt to establish the private strict liability of the risk-creating industry 
concerned, is, on the basis of the liability regime for oil pollution damage, related to 
North Sea offshore oil drilling activities.40 Oil companies reacted to the demand by 
30 The US and West-German proposals that did not obligc the Fund to indcmnify nationals from countries 
whosc oil industry did not pay contributions, thlll making control of timcly payment a national wk, were not 
adoptcd: sec comments to articlc 13, l MCO: Offeial Records oft.Ire Confernrce an tJre Estab/islrmml of an lntmratio1141 
Compmsalio11 Fud for Oi/ Polhtion Damage r971, London 1978, LEG/CONF.2/3 and vote, 
LEG/CONF.2/C.1/SR.15. 
31 Vgl 1MC0-Doc C/ES.3/5: 'Consideration should also bc given to the valuc of prohibiting completely the 
passagc oflarge ships carrying such cargocs in certain areas or on certain routes.' 
'2 See Roscnthal/Raper, 'Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liability for Oil Spill Pollution', Virginia }Ollrnal of 
Natural Resourcu law 1g8y86, 26o. 
" For fund practice up to 1g83, sec Brown, 'International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund: An Analytical 
ReJ:>rt on Fund Practice', Oil & Petrodum.ical Poll#tion rg83, 116g. 
· See, however, for the devdopmcnt ofe01cs ofoil spills, Smcts, 'The Oil Spill Risk: Economic Asscssment and 
Compensacion Limit,jou1111JI of Maritime law tzlUI Com171U&e 1983, 23. 
" Reviscd TOV A LOP and CR 1 ST ALschemes again 'voluntarily' bridgc the time lag until cntry into forceof 
the protocols, sec D. Abecassis/D.Jarashow, 'Oil Pollution from Ships', l11Urnational, U11ited K111gdom anti United Stales 
Law tzlUI Prattiu, London 1g85, 303 seq. 
16 Seejacobscnffrotz, 'Thc 1984 London Protocols and the Amoco Cadiz' ,Jo11rna/ of Marilime L4la allli CommPa 
1g84, 467. 
57 Dra.ft CollM!lion on Liabüit.J atuf Competualio11 Ui Connaion witlt tlu Carriage of NoximJ.s anti HQ.(.artkius Suhstanas OJ &a 
(H N S-Convention); /nJm14tilm4' Llgal Matmals 19'14, 150. 
'.18 for discussion sec de Bievre, 'Liabilicy and Compensation in Connell:ion with the Carriage of Noxious and 
Hazardous Substances by Sca' ,joumal of Maritimt l.Aw anti Commrra 1 !)86, 61. 
39 Dra.ftArtidtJfora COllUll.liancn Ciuil Li4biliVfor Damagt Cauud Drtring Carriagtof D411gerous Goods by Rood, Rail atuf 
ltda"Ni Nwigation Vemls; Rabtls Litsdirift.for tDUl4MiJdus wuJ intmuilionalu PrU:atrtchJ 1 g87, 466. See Richter-Hannes, 
'Der Schutz Dritter bei Gefahrguttransporten', l' NI D RO f T-Ko11&mtionsmJwv.rf r:on 1g86; loc cit, 357. 
40 ConunJion 011 Ciuil Liabüit.Jf11r OiJ Polhtlitm DOJ1U1gt Rtsu/Jingfrom ExphJratio11for and &p[qjtation ofSealud Mineral 
Resourw 1976; fnln'national Llgal MaleritW rgn, 1451. 
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concluding another 'voluntary' liability regime.41 Again there was no discussion of any 
participation in the scheme by the licensing states.42 On the contrary, the international 
convention was eventua1ly virtually aborted because it did not improve the situation of 
victims, including coastal states, as compared to the compensation available to thcm 
under the existing regime based on a combination of remedies under both the applicable 
national laws and OPOL providing an easy and quick procedure though limiting the 
amount of available compensation, between which the victim has to choose. 
States with a strong private-owned industry (primarily western states), are still not 
prepared to accept liability for damage arising out of private activities under their 
control. The developments of the past two decades indicate, however, that this does not 
necessarily mean that no compensation is available. On the contrary, between the two 
layers existing in theory, i.e. private liability according to national law and international 
liability, a third layer has been introduced. Here states accept the obligation to develop 
international law in order to assure the necessary means ofrecourse. They negotiate and 
conclude on this behalf international agreements governing liability and compensation 
issues. The financial burden, however, is placed on the branches and enterprises--
private or state owned--creating the risk. In cases where enough financial assets are 
available, this might, from the environmental and economic point ofview, weil be the 
best solution as externalization of economic risk is avoided not only on the state level, 
but, according to the 'polluter pays' principle, also on the level ofbranches and activities 
creating the risk. 
The attitude of the state community to developing the issue of liability for trans-
boundary environmental damage, especially on this new layer, is reflected in two 
international instruments not confined to liability issues. During the 1972 Conferenceon 
the Human Environment, which took place only a few months after the convention 
establishing the exclusively private-financed Oil Pollution Compensation Fund bad 
been adopted, states were not able to agree on international liability for transboundary 
environmental damage. They merely accepted in principle 22 of the Oeclaration of 
Principles, the obligation 'to co-operate to develop further the international law 
regarding liability and compensation for the victims ofpollution and other environmen-
tal damage' .43 There is no indication that this wording indicated the development of 
liability exclusively on the international level. The formulation offers at least the 
possi bili ty of developing the international law ofliabili ty on the model of the oil poll u tion 
compensation regime, i.e. on a privately financed level. One commentator explicitly 
considers the oil pollution compensation regime tobe an example of the development of 
that principle.44 
In this connection, a last minute amendment to the Declaration is of interest. The 
draft principle on liability was originally worded as including 'liability and compensa-
tion in respect of damage to the environment45 and thus might have included claims regarding 
the injury to state sovereignty which would have to be compensated necessarily by the 
source state. The version adopted excludes precisely this kind of im material injury and 
41 Olfslwrt PolllllWii liabüiry AgrwnenJ (0 P 0 L); llllmrational ugal Matnials 1974-, 1409. 
42 On ncgotiaiions, sec Archcr, 'Civil Liability for Pollution from OITshorc Operations' EmrironmntJal PoliglDlll 
Law 1976, 2 and Fleischer, 'Oil Spills: Convention to Limit Liability', Emri1'11111rU1Ual Polig and Law 1977, 76. 
43 UN -Confercncc on thc Hum an Environment, Dcclaration of Principlcs, Princlplc 22; NC ON F .1,ß/ 14/Rev.1. 
+f Sec 0. Kolbasov, Umwt/tscludz Null Vö/kmtclli, Moskau 1985, 38. 
0 Sec Principle 19 (latcr Principlc 22) in thc rcport ofthc PrcparatoryCommiuce, NCON F.48/PC.16, para 19, 
cmphasis added. 
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embraces private persons and states in their capacity as victims only in respect of 
material loss or damage. Consequently, all liability arising out of the requirements of 
principle 22 might be placed only on private operators of dangerous activities. 
This interpretation is corroborated by the wording of the principal article of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning state responsibility regarding the maritime 
environment46 as it explicitly mentions privately financed means of compensation. The 
article reftects the incohate general state of the law on international liability, stipulating 
only that states shall be liable 'according to international law',47 though they must 
'ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems'. Below the level 
of international liability, the convention introduces a general obligation of states to 
develop the means of compensation on a private basis. Eventually, states are obliged to 
develop both the international and the transnational levels ofrecourse for damage to the 
marine environment. Obviously inßuenced by the oil pollution compensation regime,48 
the convention in fact introduces a median layer based on both a concerted action of 
states and on private finance, that is distinct from the bottom layer of private recourse 
according to national law and from the top layer of international liability. lt is 
remarkable that there was agreement to circumvent the so far unsuccessful development 
of detailed norms governing international liability49 and to introduce instead a new level 
ofliability facing less resistance. 
111. International Liability in Conventional Regimes 
Apart from the 'private' liability approach, several conventions in the areas of nuclear 
and space law stipulate different forms ofinternational liability. We will now investigate 
whether they offer precedents for the development of a general obligation of interna-
tional liability for transboundary environmental damage. 
lt is true that five conventions on liability for transnational nuclear damage50 
introduce the standard of absolute liability combining private and international ele-
ments, but reducing the analysis of the liability regime to these characteristics51 means 
losing sight ofthe policy objective ofthe treaties. For the regimes contain two other far 
more crucial elements. The conventions introduce the system of 'channelling' liability, 
46 Anicle 235 of the Unittli Na/UJ11J Conllnllitm on tJu law of tJie &a 1g82; lnternatioMl ugal Materials 1g82, 1261. 
47 The obligation is not confined to liability following a brcach of a nonn ofintemational law. On the contrary, it 
extends into the arta ofprimary rules; sce Handl, 'International Liability ofStates for Marine Pollution', Canaliitlll 
Y tarbook of /11/multimal Uiw 1 g83, 103 scq. 
48 Sec An 253.3: ' ... devclopment of criteria and procedures ... , such as compulsory insurance and 
compcruation funds'. See alw Stein, 'Principles ofRcsponsibility and Liability in the Law ofthe Sea', in: R. Stein 
(ed), Critical EnuimmmJai lsnus on tltt Low of tlu &a, 1975, 50. 
49 The Conferencc agreed in an early stage not to cnter into detailed ncgotiations of liability issues, sce G. 
Timagcnis, lntmralioruzl Cordrol of Mariu Pollution, New York 1g8o, Vol 2, 624. 
!IO 'Convention on Thin:I Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Encrgy' 1g6o (Paris Convention); farop«ut 
Yltlrbook 1gfio, 2os; 'Conventioo on the liability of thc Operators of Nuclear Ships' 1g62; Ameriam }DllrMl of 
/fl1muUional Low 1g63, 268; Convention Supplemcntary to the (OEEC) Paris Convention 1963 (Brussels 
Supplcmentary Convcnrion); /1llmlaJWtW u1aJ Maurials 1963, 685; International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage 1g63 (ViennaConvention); UN T~Snü.rVol 1®3, Nr I-16197, p. 263; Convention Relaring to 
Civil Liability in the Ficld of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 1972; flllmlaliDnal Uf!.al Ma1n1al.s 1972, 277. 
)I See Goldie, 'International Principles ofResporuibilicy for Pollution', Cohun/JiajoarMl ofTraJtSMIWnal Lai.o 1970, 
311, holding that 'thc concept ofabsolute liabifüy devcloped in the nuclear liability treaties, more effcctivcly than 
any other concept prcsented so far, preomls tJie CTttlÜJT of a ri.sk.from pa.uing tluzl risk rmlD the publit llJUi tJw ufn'OIJriatiltl 
weallh aru/ securil.J ft11111 olhn ptopli ( emphasis added). 
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i.e. concentrating all liability onto the operator of a nuclear installation, thercby 
abolishing any liability of any other possible defendant that might otherwise have been 
in issue. They also stipulate a severe limitation ofliability resu)ting in only a Jow amount 
of compensation actually being available in case of damage. lt was these two lauer 
elements that led to the adoption of the conventions. 
Western European govemments that desired to develop the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy were heavily dependant on US suppliers. In the USA these suppliers had 
already achieved a discharge of the high and incakulable risk of liability involved. By 
contract, and later by law,52 the governmental operator ofthe first atomic energy plants 
agreed to assume the entire liability in order to induce private companies to participate 
in the technological development ofthe new energy.53 
In Western Europe the development of nuclear energy might potentially have been 
hampered un1ess the introduction of a similar rule excluded liability of the suppliers.s. 
Thus all liability was channelled to the operator55 as had been done in the USA. 
Against this background it is not surprising that the liability of the operator bad to bc 
absolute,~ as every exception might open a loop-hole for undesirable recourse against 
persons other than the operator und er ordinary la w. I t explains furthermore why there is 
practically no provision for a right of recourse for the operator against suppliers and 
others. 
Three major interest groups participated in the OEEC expert meetings preparing a 
draft treaty on this subject. Western European states were eager to develop a promising 
source of energy; suppliers insisted on preclusion of liability on their part,57 and 
European insurance companies tried to minimize the incalculable risk that they would 
have to undertake.58 All were interested in the development of nuclear energy and 
elaborated a regime acceptable to their particular interests. Hence, deliberations took 
place without any representation of the interests of possible private or state victims. One 
of the major factors of negotiations aiming at increasing liability for environmental 
damage, the conflict ofinterests between risk creators and possible victims, was therefore 
missing. 
The contracting parties of the resulting Paris Convention intended to adopt only one 
part of the VS system and thus placed a limited and insurable private liability onto the 
operator. Not being able toagree upon the US modeJ ofadditional government financed 
52 See Pricc-Andcrson-Amcndmcnt, Sec 17o;J. Weinstein (cd): 'Nuclcar Liability, Progress in Nuclcar Encrgy', 
Vol 3; Scrics X: lawanti Atlmini.straJüm, 378. Channclling is hcre achicvcd by an 'umbrclla-insurancc' ofthcoperator. 
'' Thercby tramfcrring thc system applicd during thc devclopmcnt of nuclcar wcapons, sce Hcnncuy, 
'lndcmnification ofthc U.S.A.E.C.'s Contractoni Against Liability for Nuclear lncidmts', in:J. Weinstein (n 52), 
252 scq. 
M See Bclscr, • Atomic lllib: Third Party Liability and lnsurancc', 0 E EC ( cd): 77te JnJ/ustriaJ Cludlen11of Nuclar 
Enno (AmsUi-tkm CMl/1Tt11a), Paris 1958, 278. 
" See thc reasoning for this rule dcpriving victims of othcrwisc open wa}'3 of recourse in 'Explanatory 
Memorandum'; EurofJtan Ytarbook 1g6o, 225, para 15. 
56 See Goldic, 'Liability for Damage and thc Progn:siiive Dcvclopment of International Law', /TllmuzliDntd IDl4 
(;q,,,paraliDt lAllJ QIUUUrly 1 g65, 1 2 16 scq. 
57 Sec in that rcgard /nlmr/ltiona/ Problmu of FiMllr:iJJJ Prottrtüm Against Nrauar Rül.:, A Study Undcr thc Auspiccs of 
Harvard Law School and Atomic lndustrial Forum, lnc, Cambridge, Mass, 1957, 56 seq. 
58 Sec Bclscr, 'Examen des solutions apportecs par lcs lois nationales et lcs convcntions internationales sur la 
rcsponsabilite dans le domaine de l'encrgic nucleairc aux problemes poses aux assureurs par la couvcnurc de ccue 
rcsponsabilitc', Droü !Uldiair1 nroplni, Colloqiu (5.-S. mai 1g66), Paris 1 g68, 78. Thc insurancc industry foundcd for 
this purposc a Research Ccntrc, see H. H ug, HaflpjädiJ fo ScMtJm azu tin friullidim Vnwnuümg tin Atorrulurgü, DiJs. 
Zürich 1970, 25. 
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c_ompensation, states were prepared to place onto the public of countries the burden of 
the largest part of the risk. 59 Acceptance of sufficiently high private liability would have 
precludecl the need to adopt an additional layer of international liability .60 The limit of 
private liability was, however, so low61 and so disproportionate compared to the damage 
of a possible accident, as well as compared to the huge investments in nuclear 
installations, that suppliers feared some Iiability would occur on their part in spite of the 
requirement of channelling. 62 Again there was a threat that the nuclear energy 
programme would be hampered by the Iiability issue. 
The süppliers' pressure63 and not the victims' interest is the reason for the eventual 
agreement on conclusion of the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which obliges the 
licensing state of a risk-prone installation to provide assets constituting another layer of 
compensation and establishes a fund financed by all contracting states constituting a 
third layer of compensation. 
Hence, the combined Paris/Brussels regime was not intended to improve the situation 
of possible victims but to regulate the international law of liability for transnational 
nuclear damage according to the needs for unhampered technological development. 
Primarily the influence of the suppliers made states accept a government financed 
compensation scheme reinforcing the system of channelling. The intention of the 
conventions was thus a general limitation ofliabilities both in regard to the amount of 
compensation and to the parties liable. 
We should briefly mention the transport liability convention, an even better example 
of this general intention. Operators of nuclear plants are, according to the Paris and 
Vienna Conventions (similar to the Paris Convention, but concluded at a global level), 
absolutely liable for all damage occurring in connection with their activity, including 
damage during carriage of nuclear material. However, in 1960 drafters were not 
prepared to intervene in the separate body of private maritime law64 and did therefore 
not exclude shipowners from liability. Whereas the absolute but severely limited liability 
of the new nuclear energy law extended to maritime transport of nuclear material, the 
rule channelling did not. 65 
The limited absolute liability of the operator as compared to (in some cases) the 
unlimited liability of the shipowner made maritime transport of nuclear material 
virtually impossible66 unless a contractual obligation was assumed by the concemed 
is lt was their way amwering thc question of 'how much of this risk should be bome by the operator ... , how 
much by thc individuals who suffcrcd thc damagc, and finally to what cxtcnt should states make availablc public 
funds for compcnsation', Explanatory Memorandum' (n 55), para 6. 
60 The major obstaclc waa not thc crcation of additional liability itsdf, but its intmr.alioMl clcmcnt. 
61 t5m USS with a possiblc rcduction by national law to not lCM than 5m USS, whcrcall combincd US-liability 
was up to 5oom USS. 
62 Thcy prcsscd for atatc participation, sec Arangio-Ruiz, 'Somc International Legal Problems ofthe Civil Usc of 
Nuclcar Encrgy', RKJUi1daOntrs107(1962-lI1), 599. 
6! Hence Hand! (n 9) 56o, is mistakcn when attributing thc subsidiary state liability of the nuclear liability 
oonvcntions to 'thc statc's ultimate control over the transnationally hazardous activity and thc benefit it prcsumably 
derives from it'. lnstcad, the rationale behind subsidiary state liability is but an economic cvaluation without rcgard 
to those exposed to risk. 
64 See explanation of Explanatory Memorandum (n 55), para 34-35. 
6!I Whereas a 'supersession' clausc in the Nuclear Ship Convcntion stipulates its priority over othcr transport 
agreemcnts, this dausc is missing in thc Paris and Vicnna Convcntioru. Evcn such a clausc howcvcr would not havc 
bccn able to avoid all conftict.s betwecn thc two laW3. 
66 Maritime insurancc companies (P&I Clubs) acluded nuclcar risks cxplicitly from their unlimitcd covcr of 
maritime risks, sccMiller, 'Llability Iruurancc CoverofCarricn by Sa ofNuclear Materials', Third Party Liability 
and lnsurance in the Ficld ofMaritime Carriagc ofNuclear Substancc', Moruuo-Symposiwn 1g68, 283. 
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operator to accept unlimited reimbursement of possible claims against the shipowner,67 
thereby expressively circumventing his privilege of limitation.68 Interested in both 
ensuring the economic benefit of maritime transport and the operators' privilege of 
limitarion ofliability, Western European states and the USA negotiated in co-operation 
with maritime and nuclear interest groups a short Convention, simply channelling all 
claims to the Paris/Brussels regime.69 Its only purpose is to avoid any liability of 
shipowners in relation to maritime transport of nuclear material. Hence, it simply limits 
Jiability according to international nuclear law with no substitute compensation for the 
lost additional liability70 under private maritime law. lt thus simply bridges a gap left 
open by the Paris and Vienna conventional regimes. 
The parties negotiating in Paris, Brussels and later on in London were industrialized 
countries from a relatively homogenous region and had therefore similar interests. The 
Vienna Convention, negotiated on a global Jevel, Jacked these favourable conditions. 
Socialist countries did not depend on US supplies. Developing countries were divided 
into two groups, with some considering themselves exclusively as purchasers of 
nuclear equipment and therefore demanding a liability of suppliers and some con-
sidering themselves purely as victims and hence demanding high amounts of liability. 
Thus, the conference had to settle on a minimum level, introducing the principles 
of the Paris Convention with an amount of compensation not lower than a derisory 
$5 million. 
lt is true that the licensing state guarantees the financial assets necessary for 
compensation. To construe this as an example of international liability accepted by 
states71 seems, however, to overinterpret the provisions of the formal regime. Again, it 
has to be seen against the background of the extraordinary low limit ofliability set and 
the general intent to restrict transnational liability. In fact, state participation is not 
more than a compromise, aUowing the socialist countries to substitute the compulsory 
insurance of the operator with a state guarantee. 
There is one other convention governing liability for transnational nuclear damage. 
Though this convention regarding the liability ofoperators of nuclear powered ships has 
never entered into force, 72 its liability regime facilitated the negotiations of several 
bilateral treaties governing port access of the two nuclear carriers 'Otto Hahn' and 
'Savannah'. 73 
lt was the time consuming and burdensome necessity of negotiating bilateral 
67 Sec Millcr (n 66), 285 as to US and British and Lagon:c, 'Practical Position ofNuclcarOpcrators with Rcspcct 
to Third Pany Liability lnsurancc on the Maritime Carriagc ofNuclcar Substanccs', Monaco-SJ1rlf10Silltn (n 66), 16o, 
as 10 Frcnch practicc. 
611 In othcr cascs atatcs shippcd nuclcar material on warships, sec Lagorcc (n 67), 159"-6o and OECD Rcpon to 
f MCO LEG/X 3, 3. 
69 Or, as thc case may bc, to thc Vicnna rcgimc and sirnilar national liability rcgulations. 
70 Only thc US dclcgatc suggestcd the raising, as a corollary, ofthc limits ofthe nuclcar liability rcgimes, with 
special rcgard to the Vienna conventional rcgime, sec LEG/CON F3/C.1/SR.1, 2. 
71 Sec Hand! (n 9), 540. 
72 1 t cxtends thc liability rcgimc to nuclcar warships. This turncd out to bc unacccptable ro thc two supcrpowcrs; 
sec declarations ofU Sand Soviet dclcgates at the Diplomatie Confcrcncc, Conftrma Diplom4liqut tk Droil Maritiml 
On:z:icme Session (2c phasc), Bruxellcs 1g62, Royaumc de Bclgique, Ministerc des affaircs ctrangcrcs et du 
commcrcc cxtcrieur, Brusscls 1g63, 6og and 664 scq. 
7ll Sec Könz, 'Thc 1 g62 Brussels Convention on thc Liability of thc Operator ofNuclcar Ships', Arnmcanjountal of 
/tttmuztiotud laUJ rg63, 111; for 'Savanah'-trcatics sec Boulangcr, 'International Convcntions and Agreements on 
Nuclcar Ships; Nuclcar Law for a Devcloping World', I A EA legal Striu No 5, Vicnna 1g6g, 179 scq; for 'Otto 
Hahn'-trcaties sec Breucr, 'Rcflcctions on International Agreements Covering thc Trading in Forcign Waten ofthe 
"Otto Hahn" '; ~posium 011 Nuck4r Ships, Hamburg 1971, 930 seq. 
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agreements with each port country that led the US Government74 to initiate the project 
of a global convention when the first nuclear carrier was under construction. Thus, the 
principal idea behind the convention was to provide for a legal regime that would 
facilitate the development of this new form of propulsion. Accordingly, liability would 
not be governed by private maritime law but by the principles of nuclear liability law. 
This time, however, not only suppliers75 but also port states were pressing for high 
amounts of compensation. Their strong position explains why at the same time basically 
the same group of states, represented sometimes by the same delegates, 76 settled in 
Vienna for a minimum liability of a low U SS5m, whereas in Brussels they had agreed 
upon a US$1om Jimit. This meant of course that it was necessary also to provide for a 
state guarantee as it was out of the question that such an amount was insurable at that 
time. Though states carefully avoided any direct liability by wording the clause so as to 
oblige them only to provide the operator with the necessary financial assets, they 
nevertheless did, as in the case ofthe Brussels Supplementary Convention, accept some 
liability obligations in their capacity as licmsing states. 77 Whereas in this case the interests 
of possible victims have been represented, the interest in regime creation stemmed 
nevertheless from the few industrial states that desired to develop nuclear propulsion. 
The Paris/Brussels/London regime was a direct result of a threat by suppliers and 
carriers to boycott the programme. Tue nuclear ship Convention in addition faced some 
pressure from possible victim states. lt merits attention, however, that, though in a 
strong position, they did not manage to raise the available amount of compensation to a 
level of an estimated actual damage. 78 
All nuclear liability Conventions were intended to overcome practical obstacles 
hampering the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Technological and 
energy policies simply could not have been perceived or developed without international 
rules. States bad to attract sufficient economic support for the programmes decided 
upon. Thus the liability regimes were primarily a device for implementation of these 
programmes. Herein lies the principal difference in political background when compar-
ing them to the oil pollution compensation regime. 
This conclusion is, to be sure, not true for the space liability Convention79 which 
stipulates the unlimited and absolute international liability of the controlling state for all 
damage occurring on earth. Unlike in all other liability regimes, no private liability 
element exists. lt might therefore be considered a precedent for a future regime 
74 The US govemment initiated a project in thc two atomic fora ofO EEC and 1 AEA. This explains the hasteof 
the traditional maritime law forum, the 1 M C; sec Röhreke, Hafaurg dn altnngttrillmtn Sdziffi, Hansa 1g6o, 291 and 
Colliard, 'Convention de Bruxelles relative a la responsabilite des exploitanu de navires nucleaircs', Asf>«l.S du Droit 
lk l'EnergieaJmniqru; Institut de Droit comparC: de l'Universitc de Paris, Paris 1g6~"» Vol 1, p. 234. Contrast, however, 
G. Hoog, Dil Ko-iitm ilherd11 Hefturrg dn lnhabtr 1>0n RlllA:torsclriffm oom 23. Mai 1g62, Hamburg 1970, S.13. For the 
preparations of 1 M C, sec 1 ntemational Maritime Committce, X X l Jlth Conftrenu, Rijeka 1959. 
7~ The infiucncc ofthc suppliers Ui tobe seen, for instance, rcgarding an X l X, which stipulates that thc liability 
regime of thc convcntion-including the rule of channelling-will continue for twenry-five years aftcr expiry of thc 
conventional regime for the liccnsing state, sec Könz (n 73), 110. 
76 Vgl Könz, 'La responsabilite des exploitanu des navires nucleaires. La Conf'Crcncc Diplomatique de Bruxelles 
1g61-1g62', Aspo;udM DroiJ del'Enrrgitatamiqiu, Institut de Droit comparcde l'Universite de Paris, Paris 1g65, Vol 1, 
226. 
77 The rule of channelling leads thus ultimatcly to international liability, sec P.-M. Dupuy, La ruponsahiliti 
inln'niltiM!ale du EtaJs pour ks dammagu d'origi111 tecluiolagiqtu tl Wiustriel, Paris 19 76, 1 13 seq. 
78 Instead, they settled for an amount less than that of the Paris/Brusscls regime, providing for an ovcrall 
indemnity or at that time u ss 12om. 
19 Convemion on International Liability for Damage by Spacc Objccts, 1972; btUnlatWtal Legal Malnials 1971, 
g65. 
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governing international liability for transnational environmental damage. However, 
again the political background that renders the regime rather exceptional has tobe taken 
into account. 
Outer space is an area of high military sensitivity. Both superpowers, as well as 
smaller states at that time able to engage in space activities, were not interested in 
extending the arms race into space. Hence, political and security considerations 
necessitated agreement by both military blocks on a legal regime of outer space at the 
peak time of the 'Cold War' .80 The United Nations, as the only global and political 
international organization, appeared to be the proper forum for negotiating this objec-
tive.81 Thus, following a long procedural struggle,82 serious negotiations on a space 
regime began in 1962 in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
Whereas the Soviet Union was primarily interested in negotiations on general 
principles,83 the USA favoured tackling the thorny issue ofliability for damage arising 
out of space activities.M As a political compromise, it was agreed to proceed with both 
the elaboration of principles85 and a specific convention on liability as well as other 
specific issues. Contrary to nuclear Iiability law and possibly also that conceming 
maritime carriage ofoil, the dangerous activity in question was not going tobe hampered 
by liability issues. Participating states had instead to overcome severe political obstacles 
not blocking the activity itself, but threatening global security. 
When in 1966, based upon the primary agreement of the two superpowers,86 the Outer 
Space Treaty was adopted,87 it was agreed, within the political context of the legal 
regime on outer space, that there should be a tight regime based on international 
responsibility of the controlling state not only for activities on its own behalfbut also for 
private activities carried out under its authority. The stipulation of the international 
liability of the controlling state88 corroborates its obligation continuously to supervise 
and control governmental, as weil as private, space enterprises. lt has tobe seen in the 
framework of the space regime and not as a mere technical question ofhow to adjust the 
economic risk involved in space activities. 
A private liability regime placing only subsidiary obligations on the Iicensing state, as 
established in the case ofnuclear energy, was never seriously discussed,89 though it was 
80 4 November 1957 ehe Soviel Union launchcd 'Sputnik 1'. 
11 The General Asscmbly immediately adoptcd a Resolution confining space activities to pcaceful purposcs, sce 
UN-Resolution 11,.S (XI 1) (1957). 
112 Forthc roleofthe UN in the negotiationssecC. Chrutol, Th Modnn lawofOuW-Spact, New York 19'14, 121eq. 
Accordingly, the principle of consensus was adopted; sec Galloway, 'Consensus Decisionmaking by the Unitcd 
Nations Commi!lec on the Peaceful UBC:il of Outer Spa.ce',j"1Jrna1 of Space Law 1979, 3 seq. 
113 Sec NAC.1oyC.2/SR.1, 6 and SR.14. 3. 
84 SeeNAC.105/C.2/SR.1. 
115 See Declaratüm of Legal Prin&ipks GoDmling the Activitiuill Ovw-Spau, UN-Resolution 1962(XV111), adoptcd in 
1 g63; for international liability sec para 8. 
111 On thc domination ofthc bilateral relation ofthe two superpowers sec Courteix, 'La cooperation amcricano-
sovictique dans le domaine de l'exploration et de l'utilis.ation pacifiquc de l'espa.ce cxtra-atmosphcrique', A11111U1ire 
FrlltfflJiJ de Droil lnJmtali4nal 1972, 734· 
87 Treaty on Legal Principles Governing thc Activities ofStatcs in thc Exploration and Usc ofOutcr Spacc, 1 g61; 
Amnlaul }tnmu1l of lntmuzti.onal Law 1 g61, 644. 
11 See Art. V II: 'Each Stare Party to thc Trcaty that launches or procurcs the launching of an objcct into outcr 
space ... and each Statc Party from whosc tcrritory or facility an objcct is launched, is intemationally liablc for 
damagc to another State Party to the Treaty or to ics natural or juridical pcrsons by such objcct ... '. 
119 Evcn thc USA proposed international liability, sec NAC.1oy6, 7. On thc contrary, thc Sovict Union 
proposcd that all activitics of any kind penaining 10 thc exploration and usc of outer space shall IH CMriltJ Olll sokly tUUi 
eubisiDtlJ b.1 Slllles'; 5CC proposal for a declaration of principles, NA C. 1 oy6, 4 ( cmphasis addcd). 
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promoted by private institutions and interest groups.90 States obviously considered 
space activities as primarily affecting not their economic but, on the contrary, their 
military and security interests. 
Accordingly, economic questions played but a minor role. There was practically no 
discussion on the need for a standard of absolute liability.91 Furthermore, states settled 
eventually for unlimited liability, whereas the limit ofstate guarantee had been a prime 
issue during negotiations on nuclear liability. Space activities seemed for a long period to 
be confined to a few economically strong countries with all others considering themselves 
as possible victims. On the other hand, issues involving aspects of state sovereignty 
appeared to be important obstacles in this field. Whereas other liability conventions 
identify national courts as the forum for settlement of disputes, in the case of space 
disputes litigation is tobe initiated through cumbersome diplomatic channels and any 
decisions of arbitration commissions are not binding. 
The highly politicized background of the decade-long negotiations, and the low 
ranking of economic issues, render the liability Convention for space activities a project 
strictly distinct from all other conventional liability regimes for transnational 
environmental damage. Though it is intended to avoid externalization of economic risks, 
the obligation of channelling liability on to the controlling state has, in an exceptional 
political context, been influenced prirnarily by rnilitary and security interests. 
IV. Conclusion 
As the number of Conventions is low and can in fact be further reduced to three 
categories oftreaties, one has tobe careful in generalizing. Focusing on the multitude of 
equally dangerous activities that are so far not governed by specific regirnes but instead 
by the inapplicable and therefore still unapplied general norms ofliability, what criteria 
for the development ofthese general norms may be derived from the preceeding survey? 
To begin with, without conventional regimes in all cases activities could not have been 
carried out as smoothly as has been possible under these regimes. Conventions thus 
avoided hampering and blocking the dangerous activities and reduced transaction costs. 
This survey, however, has revealed important differences between regimes and the 
heavy influence of political circumstances on regime mechanisms. 
First of all, we are faced with two types of regimes stipulating different forms of 
international liability. Whereas the space liability regime expressly excludes private 
participation, nuclear liability law requires that liability of the operator be established. 
The key distinction explaining these differences seems to be the relation between 
military and security (i.e. political) aspects, on the one side, and economic aspects, based 
to a !arge extent on civil considerations, on the other. 
Regarding space activities, military and civil components were at the time of regime 
creation, and are still today, heavily intertwined. Military and global-political con-
90 Sec Cooper, 'Memorandum ofSuggestioru for an International Convention on Third Party Damage Causcd 
by Space Vehiclcs', Haley/Grönkers (cds): X lth lnJtmatio11a/ AstroiuuUieal Congrw, Procuding.s, Vol 3: Third Colloqivm 
cm tlu Law of Orun Spau, Stockholm rg61, r ~ sec also Bodenschatz, 'Vonichläge zu einem internationalen 
Haftungsabkommen betreffend Schäden, verursacht durch Raumfahrzeuge, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die 
TI!fkcit priv_a1er
0
Halter', ~tschri/k_f!': Lll.ft- wul Rmmijalrrtrtdu 1g65, 313. 
Sec Pfeifer, International Liab1hty for Damage Causcd by Spacc Objcct.s', üitschrifl for u.ft· wuJ Weltr/1Jl171rtcht 
1981, !l!ll. 
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siderations have always been a domain of govemmental interest. At the time of 
negotiations on liability for space activities, this interest obviously prevailed. Tue 
general space regime being in the centre of policy consideration, the impact of 
environmental and economic interests on the liability regime had been sharply reduced. 
Thus, some details of the regime, including the quality of providing for unlimited 
international liability, are based on a principal decision to extend direct state control 
into outer space. They may not be explained by environmental or economic pattems as 
was the case in the nuclear energy regimes. 
Regarding the civil use of nuclear energy, the economic and the military political 
sphere bad at the time of regime-creation already been separated off. The civil use of 
nuclear energy was largely outside the scope of military considerations. F ollowing tests 
ofSoviet nuclear bombs, US President Eisenhower adopted in 1957 a policy restricting 
only military proliferation of nuclear technology whereas for civil purposes it was 
distributed relatively unhampered. Only some technical questions, including liability, 
had tobe solved. Therefore, negotiations were attended primarily by experts in liability 
and nuclear energy issues and proceeded in 'technical' fora. In the case of the nuclear 
ship Convention, however, by including nuclear powered warships in the liability 
regime, negotiators neglected the strict division between military and civil issues. 
Immediately, military political considerations92 prevailed, as they did in space law, and 
the treaty itself never entered into force. The experts were, however, able to work out an 
applicable conventional regime based on the needs of an infant industry that involved 
high risk being dealt with in several bilateral agreements. States accepted, as in the other 
regimes on nuclear liability, public participation in the liability only as far as necessary 
and only in addition to the limited private liability. The fairly unanimous decision in 
favour of private liability, adapted to an economic activity designed for future operation 
under private control, was a matter of principle. The subsidiary liability of licensing 
states, at a preliminary stage ofthe industry, was but a matter ofpracticality. 
Transport of dangerous substances is tobe considered an almost purely economic 
activity. A comparison with nuclear liability law discloses a second major distinction. 
Whereas in one case states engaged in subsidiary Iiability, in the other they did not. The 
US delegate to the 1969 Brussels Conference suggested as a criterion that state 
participation 'should only be considered if it could be shown that incremental insurance 
costs resulting from a traditional type though high Iimit maritime law solution were so 
huge as to make it uneconomic for vessel owners to continue in business'.93 In other 
words, states were not prepared to engage in subsidiary liability as long as the industry in 
question itself is able to bear the burden of increased liability. Contrary to the case of 
space law, the consideration is here not one of principle, but of pure economic 
evaluation. lt is the same criterion as bad been applied in nuclear liability law. Only in 
one case was subsidiary state participation deemed necessary, in the other it was not. 
Future attempts to regulate liability in other areas of dangerous activities will, 
therefore, have to focus primarily on the economic capacity of the risk-creating industry 
to bear the burden of increased liability. lt is of little use insisting on a formal 
9'J Thc US dccision not to sign thc convcntion camc as a surprisc to thc US dclegation at thc confcrcncc, too, sec 
Boulangcr, ':iojahrc Rcaktorschitrs-Haftungs konvcntion. Der alte Mann und das Seerecht', Atllm/PirtscM.ft 1g82, 
426. U S-shipping and nudcar industrics wcrc in favour of a U S-signaturc, sec Cavcrs, 'lmproving Financial 
Protcction for lhe Public against Hazards ofNuclear Power', HaT1Jtlrd Lmo R4IJinD 1964, 684 seq. 
93 LEG 1 ll/WP.1, 2-3· 
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transference ofone of the existing regimes into other areas without careful scrutiny of the 
political and economic background.94 
States seem to accept a fully-ffedged international liability only in areas where issues 
of global and military importance prevail over economic and civil aspects. In areas 
where economic aspects prevail they obviously favour private solutions of the liability 
problem. Adequate private liability regimes in turn reduce the necessity öf elaborating 
applicable general norms of liability for transnational environmental damage as they 
discourage claims against the controlling govemment.95 Hence, whereas in theory 
international liability might be reinforced by the adoption ofliability conventions, if only 
private ones,96 de facto states become reluctant to undertake costly obligations when 
private regimes function satisfactorily. International liability tends tobe relegated to the 
realm of general rules, inapplicable by their very generality. 
As to the development of a general regime for liability for transnational environmental 
damage, we should emphasize that not all ofthe conventional regimes were intended to 
increase liability in favour of victims; nor in all cases was international liability accepted 
by states. Conventional state practice in the field of liability for transnational 
environmental damage fails to indicate a development towards an increased interna-
tional liability. On the contrary, conventions negotiated during the last two decades 
contain not international, but instead intemationally governed private liability regimes. 
An international legal instrument on liability, intended to influence political decisions, 
will have to reftect this fact. Given the general reluctance ofstates to undertake heavily 
increased liability obligations, as compared to the present dtfacto situation, the primary 
aim of such an instrument in future might be to encourage states to conclude agreements 
goveming civil liability adapted to specific areas that involve risk of transnational 
environmental damage. 
514 Sec Hand! (n g), 563-4, proposing that thc HNS-Convcntion introducc a subsidiary statc liability following 
thc allcgcd preccdcnt ofthc nuckar ship convcntion. 
~ Sec A. Springer, Tlze ltllmratimtal Law of Polluli1t11. Prot«tiltg IM Glabai Environment in a World of SoM"tign Siaus, 
Wcstpon 1g83, 139. 
11& Sec for instancc Hand! (n -1-7), IOoj., who statcs, in rcgard to ultra-hazardous activitics: 'ifthcre is an evidently 
growing international conscnsus to hold thc private actor strict liablc ... it would be difficult to maintain that statcs 
might not be held intemationally to an cqually strict standard ofaccountabiliry'. 
